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EDITOR’S NOTE
I. Commodification of the World
“Of every two problems that are discussed,” so uttered the great
Somali pastoral poet, Salan Arabay, “the first must be on the subject of
subsistence.” This is an insight that underscores an age-old and continuing truth: the replenishment of human metabolism is the key index of
our immediate existence. For the largest stretch of history, the urge to
exert human energy so as to renew it took the form of small-scale reciprocal social systems — ones in which basic needs were met through a
transparent network of organic mutuality. Such an order encompassed
within its logic key features that included access to the tools of production and the natural environment, with a minimum of privileged differentiation in the distribution of resources. But if this arrangement
stressed communality, collective welfare, and a relatively homeostatic
engagement with nature, it was also a livelihood increasingly burdened by a paucity of surplus and, therefore, intimidated by scarcity
and the unpredictable volatility of the elements. This order is no more;
its demise was announced by the coming of expropriation, private
property, exchange, and the dramatic redesigning of human productive activities. Karl Polanyi, in the mode of the great historical sociologists, writes:
to separate labor from activities of life and to subject it to the laws of the
market was to annihilate all organic forms of existence and to replace
them by a different type of organization, an atomistic and individualistic
one. Such a scheme of destruction was best served by the application of
the principle of freedom of contract. In practice this meant that the noncontractual organization of kinship, neighborhood, profession, and
creed were to be liquidated since they claimed the allegiance of the individual and thus restrained his freedom.1

Markets, in one form or another, have been around for many centuries, perhaps as far back as neolithic times.2 This is not the critical
issue; rather, what one must note here is the rise of a new economic
logic predicated upon: (a) separation of the producer from the means
of livelihood; (b) production organized for the sake of profit; and (c)
redeployment of profit for further accumulation.3 The potential and
social consequences were numerous and profound. For instance, the

xi

Macalester International

Vol. 7

state, the seminal theatre of politics, got hitched to the struggle over
the social surplus and, depending on the correlation of forces, could be
turned into a willing accomplice of the accumulators, an arbiter of colliding interests or, on rarer occasions, a defender of the broader
national interest. Socially, the eminence of capital meant the coming
centrality of class society in which distinct historic blocs, determined
by their place in the social structure of accumulation, marked the landscape of human relations, habits, and institutions. Indeed, these transformations redefined as well as crystallized new forms of power best
expressed through the mediation of money — the unit of account and
ultimate code of the new order.
While the nucleus of capitalism is said to have emerged in the
Mediterranean basin, it is the region of northwestern Europe, particularly England, that becomes the site for the birth of what Immanuel
Wallerstein calls the “Modern World-System.”4 Soon, the imperatives
of competition and accumulation already honed in the domestic arena,
detonated an explosive and flamboyant search for new lands, raw
materials, cheap labor, and new markets.5 Slaving, outright elimination
of non-Europeans, and conquest and colonialism were adopted as significant valorizing strategies for the growing commodification of geography and culture and the dominance of capital.6 In a passage that
hardly gets recalled but revelative of the original dialectic in the way it
captures both the glory and gore of this moment in the progress of
what we now commonly call the world economy, Adam Smith notes:
The discovery of America, and that of a passage to the East Indies by the
Cape of Good Hope, are the two greatest and most important events
recorded in the history of mankind. Their consequences have already
been very great; but in the short period of between two and three centuries which has elapsed since these discoveries were made, it is impossible that the whole extent of their consequences can have been seen.
What benefits or what misfortunes to mankind may hereafter result
from those great events, no human wisdom can foresee. By uniting, in
some measure, the most distant parts of the world, by enabling them to
relieve one another’s wants, to increase one another’s enjoyments, and to
encourage one another’s industry, their general tendency would seem to
be beneficial. To the natives, however, both of the East and West Indies,
all the commercial benefits which can have resulted from those events
have been sunk and lost in the dreadful misfortunes which they have
occasioned. These misfortunes, however, seem to have arisen rather
from accident than from anything in the nature of those events them-
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selves. At the particular time when those discoveries were made, the
superiority of force happened to be so great on the side of the Europeans
that they were enabled to commit with impunity every sort of injustice
in those remote countries.7

The development of capitalism, then, could be periodized into stages,
each building on the preceding one but also displaying its own peculiar characteristics.8 First came the era 1400–1770, a time of commercial
and mercantilist capitalism fueled by primitive accumulation and colonization of the Americas. This is the world of joint stock companies,
licensed by royal charters that blessed them with trade monopolies
and dominion over newly annexed areas. The second stage, 1770 –
1870, was the age of the machine, a time of the inception of intimate
linkages between science and commerce, best underscored by the
dawn of the Industrial Revolution, first in England and soon to spread
to the rest of the Continent. Some other key factors of industrial capitalism were the deepening of the division of labor as well as production such that competitive industrial companies at the center of the
system exported manufactured commodities, while peripheral zones
were typically assigned raw materials; a shedding of monopolistic
mercantilism and, in its place, the onset of a new regime of “free trade
imperialism,” furiously pursued by Britain; and a decline in the direct
ownership of colonial territories. This is the universe that Adam Smith
rationalized and celebrated in his famous treatise on international
trade. Phase three, 1870 – 1914, of the evolution of capitalism saw the
emergence of centralization and concentration of capital through huge
firms that quickly gobbled smaller ones, and a series of countries
whose industrialization had come of age so much so that they began to
challenge Britain’s supremacy in industrial production, world trade,
and finance. Here, three outcomes worthy of note were the inauguration of deadly power struggle among the contenders,9 an aggressive
realignment of state and capital, and the upsurge of new and predatory desire for worldwide colonization that resulted in the “greatest
land grab in history.” Perhaps most well known of the latter is the
scramble for Africa consecrated in the infamous Treaty of Berlin in
1884 – 85. With the exception of Japan and a few other territories, the
combination of European economic, political, and increasingly cultural
regnancy was now global. The fourth period, 1914 – 1980s, was a time
in which the conflicts among industrial states turned into harrowing
world wars, Britain’s leadership was eclipsed by the United States,
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resistance to uneven development and colonial capitalism was marked
by revolutions in Russia and China, nationalistic decolonization pervaded every zone of what was called the Third World, and the restructuring of global alliances and the onset of the Cold War emerged.
Finally, 1989 to the present might be construed as the fifth phase. With
the demise of commandist economies, the end of bipolarity, and a
dehydration of postcolonial ambitions, market economics, buoyed by
the triumph of neoliberalism, has kicked up appetites and activities
hitherto unparalled.10 The result is an inordinate extension and intensification of commodification, through the application of digital technologies to mass production and consumption — all in the service of
greater accumulation.11 Moreover, this ongoing period of hypermodernity is ushering in: (a) a dual disembedding process whereby, at once,
the economy in general is further distanced from society12 and the
financial system, in particular, not only claims a sphere of its own but
is also released from both social and productive accountability;13 and
(b) an idolaric embrace of exchange relations which, in turn, is reshaping mentalities across cultures and civilizations.14
This latest version of economic configuration, dubbed as “turbocapitalism,” and its shifting force fields of power relations bring forth
spectacular winners and wretched losers. The first comprise perhaps a
fifth of the world’s population, most residing in the core regions of the
global economy. Highly educated, well remunerated, with an immediate and easy access to the information and knowledge-based worldwide transactions and services, their condition ranges from extreme
exuberance to comfortable living.15 Even among many of those not so
fortunate as to belong to this category, there is enough evidence to
support the proposition that more human beings are enjoying longer
and healthier lives made possible by the availability of better food,
housing, and safer workplaces.16 But if the gains are noteworthy, pauperism and marginalization are the lot of hundreds of millions.17 In the
estimate of the World Health Organization, for example, seventeen
million of the damned die every year of infectious diseases linked
directly to poverty, including lack of clean water. This world of discarded people, while densely located in the regions of the South, is to
be found almost everywhere. Demonstrating the hard clarity of seeing
the world economy in its ghastly contradictions, a contemporary
scholar reports:
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The Fourth World comprises large areas of the globe, such as much of
sub-Saharan Africa, and impoverished rural areas of Latin America and
Asia. But it is also present in literally every country, and every city, in
this new geography of social exclusion. It is formed of American innercity ghettos, Spanish enclaves of mass youth unemployment, French
banlieues warehousing North Africans, Japanese Yoseba quarters, and
Asian mega-cities’ shantytowns. And it is populated by millions of
homeless, incarcerated, prostituted, criminalized, brutalized, stigmatized, sick, and illiterate persons. They are the majority in some areas,
the minority in others, and a tiny minority in a few privileged contexts.
But everywhere, they are growing in number and increasing in visibility,
as the selective triage of informational capitalism and the political breakdown of the welfare state intensify social exclusion. In the current historical context, the rise of the Fourth World is inseparable from the rise of
informational, global capitalism.18

If the penetration of the whole world by market economics is now
almost total, eternal human preoccupation with material subsistence
and security is equally most paramount.9 With a cognizance of perhaps
unprecedented opportunities that the globalization of economic space
could present to those who are ready and willing to snatch it, but
simultaneously sobered by the rise of deleterious activities that worsen
conditions of work, create unemployment, concentrate benefits on the
already well-healed, circumvent if not enervate democracy, and subtract hope from the future, the time for a discussion by every community over the nature and direction of the world economy is pressing.20
At the core of the task, then, lies the perennial concern of political economy: What combinations of civic virtue, moral discourse, and public
jurisdiction might respond effectively to the “creative destruction” of
universal commodification?

II. The Roundtable
With the common realization that breathtaking economic changes are
the order of our epoch, the 1998 International Roundtable was called
into session. Despite their individual assignments and interests, all
participants were asked to keep in mind the following broad questions:
• How did the global economy evolve?
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• What forces are driving it, and what are its main and current contours?
• Is economic globalization a viable road toward universal prosperity?
• What does the transnationalization of economic space mean for traditional state sovereignty, national structures, and local community?
• Are there discernible affinities between wide diffusion of markets,
democracy, and freedom?
The opening presentation is by Keith Griffin. He confirms our
propulsion toward a global economy, coupled with a liberalization of
rules and the retreat of regulatory institutions — including the state.
For him, these developments bring in their wake comprehensive ramifications for the full topography of human existence. A key paradox
here is the optimum movement of goods and many services, while
labor is still constrained. In the meantime, rich countries guard their
borders with increasing anxiety.
Our panels start with a presentation by Saskia Sassen. She opens
her intervention with a disputation over the somewhat pervasive
assertion among scholars that the state is a diminished force in the face
of the global economy. To the contrary, she argues that many critical
elements of these activities are “located inside national economies.”
Subsequently, she looks into the rising institutional scaffolds, most of
them private, which hold the global economy together, and their interaction with the state and its key portfolios. Sarah Stucky responds
with, first, a compressed recall of the evolution of the concept of sovereignty, and then brings the discussion to Latin America — a region she
deems to be deficient in macroinstitutional capacity. Such condition,
she thinks, easily compounds vulnerabilities to transnational forces of
globalization. Alberto Armendáriz reminds us of an academic conversation of a few years ago on the “end of history” and how, in his opinion, that “overreaction” seems to be replaced with another — the
demise of the state. He draws his insight from Argentina and Chile.
Peter Rachleff directly moves on to tell a poignant story about Mexican railroad workers who, in 1998, went on strike over privatization of
such national assets as Ferronales. For him, this episode confirms the
intermeshing of the national and global, and the possibilities of a new
transnational solidarity of labor — one adept at using the newest techniques of informational capitalism.
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Next we move on to Africa. In a substantial and somber essay,
Thandika Mkandawire uncovers Africa’s experience with the vicissitudes of the age. His analysis concentrates on what he perceives to be a
dismaying disharmony between Africa’s basic interests and the whirlwinds of the global economy. To him, imperious pressures from International Financial Institutions (IFI) and the grave sins of African
leaders are the two central culprits in the derailment of the African
nationalist agenda. Richard Cawood foregrounds the dilemma that
the state in Africa is both creator of the continent’s misery and yet a
“potential” bearer of solutions. His conclusion expresses a note of
guarded optimism. Ivor Agyeman-Duah identifies freedom and
democracy as progenitors of social well being and prosperity. Consequently, he suggests that the people of the continent would improve
their capacities if they focus on the extension of liberty and autonomy
of each citizen. Vasant Sukhatme applies the combined insights of
macroeconomics and years of reading on economic development. He
vehemently quarrels with the perspective that IFI are the determining
factors in Africa’s economic policies. Rather, he asserts, internal decisions, led by chronic neglect of agriculture, are the cause of the impoverishment. He urges Africa to open its markets and nurture the growth
of the private sector.
The third conversation begins with a lengthy and luminous essay by
Meredith Woo-Cumings. With the recent financial meltdown in Asia,
she focuses on the issue of “corporate governance.” It is her conviction
that amongst the main reasons for the calamity, the most notable is the
“failure of regulation.” Moreover, lest one thinks the region is only one
type, she adds into the already variable geometry of the economic profile the differences between Northeast Asia and the Southeast. The
first, and particularly South Korea, is her primary target. Christina
Szitta expresses concern over, in her mind, the absence of serious
attention to the way in which the chaebol’s role in the world market
ramify in the domestic context. She thinks the issue of equity looms
large and points out the problematic nature of an application of the
“rule of law” to create transparency in such complex affairs. Katrina
Strickland agrees with the necessity of reform but suggests that success would depend on the specificity of the country and its place in the
global economy. Andrew Latham brings in the cultural dimension of
what otherwise would seem to be purely economic truths. He goes on
to retell, telescopically, the invention of the West as the rational modernizer and Asia as a deviant other. Updating this phenomenon by
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encountering it with the present, he suggests that a novel type of “economic orientation” is being put forth in contrast to the “Anglo-Saxon
neoliberal” form of conduct. Latham postulates that the real project is
to recreate East Asia’s economies so to make them comply with gyrations of the dominant Western practices.
The final session is organized around Vladimir Popov’s presentation. He engages what is certainly one of the hallmarks of this side of
the twentieth-century — the “opening up” of statist economies to the
powerful thrust of the world market. Given the enormous socio-economic distress visited upon most of these societies, he raises a critical
question about the cause, strategies, and costs of transition. He offers
the intriguing thesis that the demise of the state and nonstate institutions are keys to comprehending the fate of commandist societies —
particular the USSR and its progenies. Frederick Swaniker acknowledges the contributions of the essay but regrets that the narrative ends
with the events of 1996. Further, he stresses the necessity, for developing countries, of institutional and political preparedness before one
fully sails into the rough oceans of globalization. Anssi Miettinen
warns of the pitfalls of swapping investment in export industries for
steep increases in unemployment — the lesson from Finland. He
reminds us of the value of education, flexibility, inventiveness, and
intelligence in finding a profitable niche. Gary Krueger approves of
the essay’s contribution to economic studies in general and, more
specifically, the socio-legal factors that condition what he terms
“pathological” economic orders. He concurs with the conclusions but
takes issue with certain elements of the analysis.
If globalization is pressing hard on livelihoods everywhere, the spiritual dimension of human existence is not immune from the tumult of
the times. The theme of the 1999 International Roundtable will be
“Contending Gods: Religion and the Global Moment.”
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